1 us daily are hidden in plain sight. Darkness, for Arendt, names the all-too-public invisibility of inconvenient facts, and not simply the horror of the facts themselves.
In Men in Dark Times, Arendt responds to what she, borrowing from Martin
Heidegger, calls the light of the public that obscures everything. The black light of the public realm is, of course, the chatter and talk that drown the reality of life in "incomprehensible triviality." It is the vapid clichés that mar speech on TV news channels and by the water cooler. For Arendt, as for Heidegger, "everything that is real or authentic is assaulted by the overwhelming power of "mere talk" that irresistibly arises out of the public realm."
3 And yet, Arendt, unlike Heidegger, resists the philosophical withdrawal from the public world into a realm of philosophical contemplation.
Instead of world-weary withdrawal, Arendt writes with the conviction that "we have the right to expect some illumination." The darkness of the public spotlight is, she insists, not inevitable. On the contrary, it is possible and even necessary that darkness cede to light.
In seeking light in the public realm, Arendt shuns the embrace of rationality, democracy, and universal values that are the source of the optimism driving much of political thinking in modern times. Al Gore, for example, has recently argued that the crisis facing the nation and the world have been allowed to flourish because reason is under attack. In his book The Assault on Reason, Gore argues that a "faith in the power of reason--the belief that free citizens can govern themselves wisely and fairly by resorting to logical debate on the basis of the best evidence available, instead of raw power--was and remains the central premise of American democracy." That faith is, he writes, under assault. He blames TV, advertising, and the corporatization of press--all of which have undermined what Gore, citing Jürgen Habermas, calls "the structure of the public forum." 4 In the face of the dangers posed by dictators and environmental disaster, Gore embraces Habermas' claim that reasoned deliberation can yield rational and thus decent decisions. 5 For Gore, as for Habermas, dark times demand the light of reason.
The faith in reason that animates both Gore and Habermas is seductive. It speaks to the pride of man: that we, as rational beings, can come together and dispassionately and rationally move ourselves--fitfully at times--towards a better world. Our faith speaks to our scientific age, in which we believe that we can understand and improve both the natural and the political worlds. And our conviction reflects the fundamental claim of enlightenment, that our reason will set us free.
For Arendt, however, to reassert our rationalist tradition in the face of its rampant violation is to ignore the facts of our times. If the last 100 years have taught us anything, it is that "the subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition." 6 If reason risks descending into the justifications and rationalizations that spread darkness in our times, Arendt argues that the only reliable source of light in dark times is found in the activity of thinking. From the beginning to the end of her writing life,
Arendt situates herself as a thinker even as she warns against the dangers of reason. In
The Origins of Totalitarianism, her grand inquiry into the roots of totalitarianism in rootlessness, loneliness, and thoughtlessness, Arendt frames her inquiry as an effort of comprehension, by which she means "the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality--whatever it may be." In The Human Condition, she explains her project as a "matter of thought" that opposes the thoughtlessness that "seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time." And in her engagement with what she saw as the thoughtlessness behind Adolf Eichmann's evil deeds, she asks: "Could the activity of thinking as such be among the conditions that make men abstain from evildoing or even actually "condition" them against it?" 8 Thinking, Arendt suggests, is the only reliable safety net against the increasingly totalitarian or even bureaucratic temptations to evil that threaten the modern world.
By thinking Arendt means something quite specific, namely the silent dialogue with oneself that Socrates describes in Plato's Theaetetus. Only one who speaks with oneself will worry that in acting unethically he or she will have to live with a criminal. It is Socrates' habit of thinking with his other self, his daimon, that Arendt argues stands behind Socrates' moral claim that "it would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I direct were out of tune and loud with discord, and that most men should not agree with me and contradict me, rather than that I, being one, should be out of tune with myself and contradict myself." 9 In pointing out the pervasiveness of the argument of the lesser evil, Arendt argues that it is itself rooted in a deeper phenomenon, namely the "widespread fear of judging"
that has nothing to do with the biblical "Judge not, that ye be not judged." 10 She connects the increasingly common recourse to the argument of the lesser evil with the even more pervasive unwillingness to judge in general.
This fear of judging is wide-ranging in society. We see it in social issues like euthanasia, where what was once considered deeply wrong is now often justified as a lesser evil to the pain of a slow death. 11 We suggests that first and foremost, one must be able and willing to judge. When asked or ordered to participate in an evil government, the citizen must make a judgment, one that does not depend on a rational or intellectual calculation of the lesser or greater evil.
Those who judged the Nazi regime wrong belonged to no particular class and shared no common educational background. The non-participants were not the intellectuals or the most respected members of the community. Those who resisted and those who simply withdrew into private life did not rationally consider the question of whether it was good to murder Jews. Instead, those who judged that to coordinate their actions with the regime was not a lesser evil but evil plain and simple were the ones who "never doubted that crimes remained crimes even if legalized by the government." Faced with laws and commands that rationalized actions they held to be wrong, these individuals said no; their no was based neither on a universal rationality nor social norms. academics from across the disciplines to address the relevance of Arendt's thinking. The speakers were given particular questions to respond to, questions like: "Is Totalitarianism a present danger?"; "What is the activity of democratic citizenship?"; and "What does it mean to think about politics?" In addition, we asked the participants to limit their remarks to 10 minutes. The effort was to encourage talks that avoid the regalia of disciplinary posturing and specialized jargons and move straight to the provocative questions at the very heart of Arendt's project.
Looking over the transcripts after the conference, we quickly recognized that the talks not only spoke in a provocative and incisive way. They also revealed the passionate and engaged embrace of political and ethical thinking that is too frequently lost amongst the layers of interpretation and scholarship that deadens much writing about Arendt. We therefore asked the participants to expand and polish their essays for publication. At the same time, we asked that they make an effort to preserve the style and form of the original oral presentations. The essays that follow are the result. They are as a whole shorter than typical academic essays, and they have fewer footnotes and scholarly trappings. Instead, they present efforts to think with and, at times, against Arendt in her call for thinking.
The book, like the conference that inspired it, is very much rooted in Bard Thomas Keenan, Jenny Lyn Bader, and Wyatt Mason all read and offered generous and helpful comments to earlier versions of this essay.
